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Résumé : L’article s’intéresse aux conséquences de l’ouverture totale à la concurrence dans les 
services postaux. Dans un premier temps il rappelle les caractéristiques particulières du secteur 
ainsi que le processus de déréglementation déjà engagé. Il examine ensuite les effets sur le prix du 
courrier égrené ainsi que sur la capacité de résistance de l’opérateur historique de l’ouverture totale 
à la concurrence. Il apparaît qu’après une première période de concurrence forte et de modification 
de la structure de prix, le marché pourrait atteindre un équilibre durable. 
 
 
Abstract: The paper focuses on the impact of the Full Market Opening in postal services especially 
on prices. The paper first  summons up the specificities of the sector and the deregulation 
implemented so far. The paper then studies the consequences on separated prices and the survival of 
the historical operator of market opening. It seems that after a first period of effective competition, 
with a change in the price structure, the market could reach a new steady equilibrium. 
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ON SEVERAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FULL MARKET OPENING  









The postal services are gradually opened to standard competition. A new directive published on 
February 2008 (2008/6/CE) brings about full market opening for January 2011 or, for new member 
states and Greece, in 2013. Until now, postal activity relied on a monopolistic activity and cross-
subsidisation, but, with the entry of new competitors for standard mail, this long-standing arrangement 
will come to an end. Many consequences are expected: rationalisation, speed delivery enhancement; 
more  value added services…  and a major price  evolution.  The end  of cross subsidisation could 
nevertheless cause adverse effects on  prices and induce  a  destabilisation of historical operators. 
Worries that the quality of delivery could be reduced –especially in remote areas, while prices rise up 
for individual mail are strong. 
One major aspect of this debate consists in questioning to which extent postal services achieve the 
status of natural monopoly. Indeed, overall efficiency could decrease when new competitors enter the 
market and prices. Another one is whether it could be necessary or not to protect historical operators to 
preserve some services.  The paper intends  to  propose an appraisal about these  problems,  thus 
analysing what economic consequences full market opening may bring, with a special interest for 
France. 
The paper first explores the industrial specificities of the postal service and prompts the main 
aspects of the European  deregulation  process. Several goals defined by the directives may  seem 
difficult to achieve simultaneously, especially when competitors are skimming profitable clients. The 
paper then studies the consequences on separated prices and on the survival of the historical operator 
of market opening. It seems that after a first period of effective competition, with a change in the price 
structure, the market could reach a new steady equilibrium. 
 
1. INDUSTRY’S CHARACTERISTICS OVERVIEW 
Postal service is by many means a typical service industry. 
As a service industry, postal services are not storable and it is not possible to establish ownership 
rights over the various services they provide but only on the producing system. Furthermore, postal 
activity is a labour industry, generating as an average for 20 European countries 63% of total costs    
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(NERA 2004). Postal service is also a network industry. Properly speaking the postal network includes 
two parallel networks, one dedicated to the collection the mail (upstream network), and the other one 
being devoted to its delivery (downstream network). Between the collection and the ultimate delivery 
lie intermediary processes such as transport and sorting. 
The major source of costs comes from delivery which, as an average of sixteen EU countries, 
amounts to approximately 50% of total costs (table n° 1). Let us nevertheless notice that this figure 
may be slightly underestimated since a fraction of overheads is related to delivery. For instance, 
Germany, that did not show overheads in its costs splitting, depicted in 1998 a 69% ratio for delivery 
costs (NERA 2004 p. 72). 
Table n°1 
Costs splits by activity in letter mail for Universal Service Providers 
  Collection  Transport  Sorting  Delivery  Overheads  Total 
France*  8  5  15  46  21  100 
16 EU countries unweighted 
average 
12.0  7.3  15.8  49.6  14.9  100 
Source: NERA 2004 p. 72;  (* plus other costs not elsewhere classified: 5 %)  
 
Correspondence as a whole may be divided in bulk mail, generated by firms with advertisements, 
invoices, banking statements…, and separated (including individuals) mail. In France, bulk mail 
amounted in 2005 to a 58 % of overall correspondence, but firms as a whole generated more than 
80 % of the traffic (Arcep 2007, see graph n°1)
1
Shares of volume correspondence in France  
(domestic and imports in 2005) 
.  More than two third of correspondence is send to 
individuals (Arcep 2007). Considering turnover, the weight of firms’ mail is even more significant, 
since they engender more than 90 % of the mail income (Larcher 2003 p.23).  
 
GRAPH N°1 
                                                         
 
1 As a matter of fact, taken alone (i.e. without SME’s mail), correspondence between individual customers 
amounts only to 3% of the overall volume. 
Separated mail 
from firms 23% 
Non-routed 
bulk mail from 
large senders 25% 
Separated mail 
from individuals 




Source: Arcep 2006 p.11 
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Demand is highly concentrated as, for instance in France, 40 % of the letters turnover comes from 
only 80 companies (Hérisson 2007 p. 241). Finally, though individuals remain still essential to postal 
service while being receivers, as senders they no more are. It is especially true since in the postal 
industry senders pay the bills, not receivers. 
 
Correspondence represents commonly the main share of operators’ resources. For instance, mail 
services accounted in France for nearly 77% of the total delivery turnover (table n°2). Regarding data 
of 17 European countries available from Universal Postal Union,  this latter figure,  apart from 
Germany, is fairly typical, albeit decreasing in the last years.  
The future prospects for postal services are however uncertain and raise worries. Postal activities 
are harmed by modern technological changes, as for example fax and e-mail. For instance in France 
since 1998, the growth rate of mail traffic was beneath the GNP growth rate, traffic went even down 
for several years.  
 
Table n°2 
La Poste’s 2002 turnover split by type of delivery 
  1
st split  2
nd split 
Mail  59.15  76.93 
Parcels  21.6  23.06 
Financial services**  23.1  / 
Total  100*  100 
Source: Cour des Comptes 2002 p. 18, (* 17 332 Mio Euros; ** Financial services are gathered in a 
separated company since January 2006) 
 
 
Postal service depicts many characteristics of a natural monopoly  
 
One major issue about postal services consists in questioning to which extent they achieve the status 
of natural monopoly. The answer requires an analysis of the different costs and their type.  
A natural monopoly typically undergoes high overall fixed costs and decreasing average costs, even 
null marginal costs. Its cost function should be subadditive, meaning that the cost of producing any 
level of output is less than the sum of the costs of producing it separately. The proof of subadditivity 
requires a description of the shape of the entire cost function, thus calling for data that may lie well 
beyond the range of recorded experience (Baumol 1977). Nonetheless fortunately scale economies are 
a sufficient  proof of subadditivity, as well as,  when a multiproduct industry is under scrutiny, 
complementarities in the production of the different outputs. These two requirements are easier to 
gauge and are proven commonly fulfilled by practical studies.  
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Economies drawn from  production  may be scrutinised through three dimensions: long term 
economies of scale, short-term economies of scale and economies of scope.  
Long-term economies of scale appear when an increase in traffic induces a lesser proportionate 
increase in the network. Short-term economies of scale happen when unit costs decrease while traffic 
rise, given a fixed network. Economies of scope, stemming from complementarities, relates to returns 
derived  from the jointed delivery of  various  types of mail.  It may be, for instance,  within 
correspondence depending on its speed of delivery, (D+1 D+3 D+7) and parcels that are partially 
served using correspondence network. 
The paper will only take into consideration short-term economies of scale and scope, since most 
postal services are mature in Europe. Hence the reorganisation induced by recent changes does not 
require significant network extension; actual trends rather bring network downsizing. 
 
Researches are focused on delivery since it produces the major part of postal services’ costs. The 
global cost function of postal delivery depends on several factors: distance between post office to the 
beginning of the delivery, the length of the route, number of stops, final delivery… Economies of 
scale arise when costs bear the specificity to be mainly fixed. Properly speaking, among these different 
elements, stops and final delivery are variable costs. However due to the specification of routes, that 
the postal operator tends to saturate, standard expected variations of the traffic do not induce a 
significant deviation in stops and in actual deliveries (Cohen 1997). Thus the overall delivery costs 
may roughly be considered as fix costs. This viewpoint especially holds for large markets where routes 
are more often saturated. In addition the volume delivered to each address has much effect on overall 
actual costs: the more mail delivered to an address, the lower unit delivery cost per item is. Hence the 
total emitted volume of mail per inhabitant is of much importance for delivery costs.  
To summarise, there are good presumptions of economies of scale in postal delivery. Moreover the 
higher volume per address is, the greater they may be.  
Given the previous comments, it is not surprising that John Panzar (1991) has characterised street 
delivery as a bottleneck function because a single firm can deliver to a recipient at a lower total cost 
than multiple firms delivering to the same customer. Many  researches  have  since  confirmed 
economies of scale in the postal distribution activity (see Cazals 2004 or Bradley Colvin Perkins 
2006 
2
                                                         
2  « In sum, the empirical studies in general have found output elasticities well less than 100 percent, implying 
substantial scale economies in delivery ». 
). Indeed, as long as the maximum capacity of delivery has not been reached, average unit costs 
are decreasing while traffic increases. Cohen (2003) modelled a cost function for USPS depicting 
economies of scale connected with the volume served (Graph n°2). Interestingly enough economies of    
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scale are not linearly increasing. Costs sharply drop off at the beginning of the curve, when mail per 




Model estimates of unit cost benchmarked by US costs and volume 
         





























Source Cohen (2003)  
 
 
In addition to economies of scale, there are strong cost complementarities (economies of scope) 
between the different activities carried out by postal services  (D+1, D+3, D+7;  small parcels, 
registered mail…).  
A very simple calculation, based on ARCEP (2008) incremental cost method, may provide an 
estimate of the economies of scope drawn from multi-speed activities. If different companies were 
serving D+1 (6 delivering days a week), D+3 (2 delivering days) and D+7 (1 delivering  day) 
correspondences, there would be a total of 10 served days. If one company serves all the market only 6 
delivering days are operated, thus economies of scope represents a 4 to 10 ratio (i.e. amount to 40%). 
In a duopoly context, where the first company would address D+1 and the second one D+3 and D+7 
simultaneously, the same method would give an economy of scope amounting to 25%.  
As a consequence of the last remarks, delivery, which as it was stated accounts for the major part 
of postal services costs, shows most characteristics of a natural monopoly (see also Kenny 2006). 
Moreover,  there are solid hints that collection through letter boxes may also possess  the 
characteristics of natural monopoly. Altogether nearly 70% of postal costs may be deemed as 
achieving natural monopoly attributes.     
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However, differing from typical natural monopoly, postal market, at least on specific segments, is 
easily contestable (Toledano 2004 p. 234), especially when the amount of traffic per address is high 
(de Bijl & alii 2006 cf. p.15).  
This situation stems from two sources. First it derives from the fact that most fixed costs are neither 
technical nor physical, but labour costs. As a consequence, contrary to the classic natural monopoly 
case, network costs need to be paid recurrently (every month) and not once for all. Therefore a great 
fraction of fixed costs are operational costs, not irretrievable ones. Entering the market does not 
require long-term investment charges to set up a network, but mostly the regular expenses that are 
required to operate the activity. Hence, sunk costs are quite light and entry is fairly easy. It is 
especially true if the new competitor specialises in delivering sorted bulk mail. Second, the scale and 
the scope of the network are easily adaptable; addressing the whole national market or conveying all 
sorts of mail are not the only options. Profitable niches can be created by reducing the frequency and 
the geographical extent of the delivery: not all the mail needs to be delivered as quickly as possible, 
every working day and everywhere on a given territory. For instance in Sweden, CityMail only serves 
D+3 mail, twice a week in urban areas. 
 
 
Deregulation process and Universal Service Obligations (USO) 
 
Deregulation in the postal services has been launched by the European Commission in 1997 (box 
n°1). The process progressively reduces the share of postal activities that is covered by the monopoly. 
The most recent step in January 2006 dropped the reserved area to correspondence up to 50 g.  
However, several parts of postal activity were already totally opened to competition in many European 
countries, with operators such as concentrators, sorters or routers. As a matter of fact even if several 
countries since Finland and Sweden in the early 1990’s have anticipated the FMO (namely United 
Kingdom, Germany  and  Netherlands),  for the moment most historical operators in EU are still 
benefiting from a partial monopoly. Letter delivery, which includes most of the charges, has hence 
only encountered little competition. For instance, in France the reserved area still concerns 83.5% of 
the volume of mail (graph I in annex). The impact of deregulation on income is a little more 
significant as reserved traffic amounts to only a 73.5 % (Arcep 2007)
3
                                                         
3   However, considering overall postal traffic the market share opened to competition is estimated to 46 % 
(according to La Poste 2007 activity report). 
.  Eurostat data confirms that in 
countries where opening has not yet been implemented reserved area still covers the major part of the 
correspondence market (see table n° 4).    
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Box n°1: a brief history of the market opening  
 
1989  Postal and telecommunication council invites the European Commission to prepare  
     measures to develop postal services. Deregulation policy for speed delivery postal  
     services was already opened.  
1992  Green Paper single market for postal services (COM/91/476).  
1997  1st Postal Directive (/67/EC) launches the deregulation process, market opening for  
   mail above 350 g scheduled for 1999. 
2002  2nd Postal Directive (/39/EC). 
2003  2nd reduction of the "reserved area" (100 g.). 
2006  3rd reduction of the "reserved area" (50 g.). 
2006   Commission proposes the 3
rd directive Com (2006) 594 with Full Market Opening  
     (FMO) for 2009. 
2007  (07/11) European Parliament votes to postpone the FMO to 2011. 
2008   (02/10) Final agreement sets FMO to January 2011 for EU 14 and 2013 for New  




Universal Service  
The expected evolution alters the traditional postal service organisational scheme. Postal operators 
traditionally provided an equal service, with a single price over an entire territory, even though costs 
fluctuate. Operators used  their monopolistic situation to cross subsidise non profitable activities 
(mainly separated delivery in rural areas) by profitable ones (bulk mail delivery in urban regions). 
Although tariffs are already partly adjusted for bulk mail, the end of monopoly implies the end of 
cross subsidisation. Therefore, unless significant productivity increases, while the new market 
framework pushes to match costs and prices, incumbents will be prone to reduce the quality of their 
service and rise their prices in costly areas. Full opening hence raises concern. For instance Sweden, 
where postal deregulation was completed in the early 90’s, may illustrate these worries. Prices for 
individual  correspondence  underwent a sharp rise 
4
Universal Service is a service that should be available for all users, but especially designed for 
individuals and Small and Medium Enterprises. This service includes quantified speed delivery goals 
(for d+1), affordable price, and coverage of all places on the territory at least five days a week. It 
,  while slightly decreasing  for bulk  mail 
(Andersson 2007 p. 11; Falkenhall & Kolmodin 2005 p. 23). At the same time, the number of post 
office owned by Posten AB significantly decreased, especially in rural areas (PTS 2007, Falkenhall & 
Kolmodin 2005). In addition, between 1993 and 2006 Posten AB employment declined by 33.5 % 
(PTS 2007 p. 9).  
To avoid territorial and social cohesion problems, since 1997 the directives, beyond efficiency 
enhancement and orientation towards costs, proclaim the necessity to preserve an undemanding access 
to all users with affordable prices by setting Universal Service Obligations (USO). 
                                                         
4     From 35 to 43 % in real term depending on the type of mail. This increase is partly due to the introduction of 
VAT on mail and to a transitory failure in the monitoring of prices by regulation authorities.    
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applies to correspondence up to 2 kg, parcels at least up to 10 kg and registered mail (see box n°2 and 
3). 
Directives do not impose single pricing, but should one country choose it, the Universal Service 
Provider (USP) should remain free to negotiate special discount tariffs for specific customers (art. 12 
al. 3, 1997th directive). So as to say that, after all, the single price pertains only to separate mail or 
likely to the bulk mail routes where no competitors entered. As PTS puts it: the single price « (…) 
prevents or at least makes it more difficult for Posten AB to cut prices only in areas where there is a 
local competitor » (PTS 2007 p. 9). 
 
Box n°2: Universal Service Obligations in France (01/05/2007 decree) 
 
Extent: universal service pertains to letters up to 2kg and parcels up to 20 kg. 
Delivery: delivery is effective at home for each individual or firm. Except  extraordinary 
circumstances, the service runs every working day. 
Accessibility: at least 99% of the national population and 95% of the population of each district 
(“département”) should be less than 10 kilometres from a postal contact point. Every city with 
more than 10 000 inhabitants gets at least one postal contact outlet, plus one by segment of 
20 000 inhabitants.   
Prices: except for bulk mail, a single price applies for all the metropolitan territory. 
Press delivery: newspapers and press documents recognised by the Press Parity Commission are 
delivered complying USO. The tariff structure should support pluralism. 
 
Box n°3: Special territorial cohesion regulation, (05/20/2005 act) 
 
Excepted in special circumstances, 10 % of the population of a district (“départment”) may not 
be beyond 5 kilometres or 20 minutes reach from a postal contact point.  
A special “departement” council for postal territorial localisation gives advices on the location 
of postal contact points. 
 
A special territorial compensation fund is set to finance the cost of the territorial cohesion. Its 
resources come from a discount on local taxes. Universal Service Provider obtains an 85 % 




2. WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO PRICES WITH FULL MARKET OPENING? 
 
Price competition facing Universal Service Obligations  
 
When new competitors enter the market, they are likely to skim the cream by mainly addressing 
bulk mail (D+3 or D+7) in densely populated areas. As stressed before, they may set a light network. 
In consequence entry does not imply high costs and, depending on volume per inhabitant and postal    
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density,  even if the new entrant is less efficient that the incumbent it may propose lower prices 
(Bernard and alii 2004). In these circumstances, it is worth noticing that the incumbent still faces 
roughly the same network costs, but collects fewer resources. The incumbent is therefore prone to 
lower its prices where competitors entered and raise them anywhere else; at the same time he is 
obviously prone to reduce its operating costs. The pressure on its costs result in more mechanisation 
and increase in efficiency, but also may bring diminishing network in rural areas, with less postal 
offices, fewer delivery days and higher prices. For instance, as quoted by Cazalda (2005) “outlying 
areas might receive service three days a week instead of the typical five or six currently. In other areas 
Saturday service might be eliminated”. 
The evolving structure of prices actually transfers a definite share of the network costs previously 
borne by bulk mail, towards separated mail. Yet this kind of response could in turn theoretically again 
reduce incumbent’s resources, if numerous  customers progressively leave its network considering 
prices are too high or access is too restricted. They could turn to phone, internet… other competitors, a 
damaging spiral could be triggered off, with less traffic generating fewer resources and higher relative 
costs, inducing higher prices...This process might initiate what Crew and Kleindorfer (2000) have 
named a “graveyard spiral”.  
Nevertheless, since new entrant will not attract all the potential correspondence they could, and 
since for many routes and some types of mail there will remain no substitutes, a significant share of 
traffic will be kept by the incumbent. Finally in theory free competitive pressure would tend to raise 
the price towards the cost of the most expensive routes (Cremer 2004 p. 13) while, taken as a whole, 
network and service would shrink to a new extent–price equilibrium. 
However, this process is not to be allowed to go too far. Network is a club good type; its usefulness 
goes hand in hand with the number of accessible costumers for a given period, which, on a postal point 
of view, derives from the combination of the total number of costumers, quickness and frequency of 
delivery. Let us remember that bulk and separated mail mainly share the same distribution network. 
Thus, if the network was to shrink too severely, it could also disturb the delivery of a fraction of bulk 
mail (Cremer and alii 2007), and overall efficiency might decline. The above potential withdrawal 
spiral is opportunely barred by the Universal Services obligations (USO). 
 
The USO restricts the historical operator’s capacity of response to competition; its extent appears 
thus clearly a major concern for him. Depending on the level of obligations, the incumbent will or will 
not be able to sharply downsize its network costs and raise its separated mail prices. But in any case its 
resources are to be affected. Although plainly legitimated for economical and cohesion reasons, the 
universal service could induce an unfair financial load for its provider. Therefore, all things being 
equal, USO may call for a specific compensation. There is more to say, unexpectedly main USO may 
have ambiguous effects, or even counterfactual ones, namely the combination of single pricing and 
cohesion requirements (PTS 2000).    
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On the one hand, the  single price protects costumers from being overpriced when there is no 
competitor facing the USP; it also prevents the latter to charge predatory prices on routes where 
competitors are. But on the other hand, as the single price must address all the territory, especially 
costly areas or routes, its level is too high for low cost areas and routes. It therefore gives a true 
opportunity for competitors to enter the market. Moreover, it provides also the maximum price new 
entrants may charge and simultaneously determines their profit. Not surprisingly, Cremer & alii (2001 
p. 116) find that: “Entry is viable at all the considered scales when the incumbent has to price 
uniformly. When non-uniform pricing is allowed, on the other hand, only large scale entry is 
profitable”. 
 
What price increase for separated mail? 
 
Since separated mail price is to rise to compensate the fall of bulk mail volume and price, the 
question becomes: will the increase be affordable? If not, the USP will have to strongly squeeze its 
costs and could be tempted to shrink its services in remote routes and areas. There are several ways to 
address this question. One is to analyse the unit cost per route, but it demands sophisticated data and 
methods. It  will be addressed further on. Yet fortunately, the USP faces a very simple income 
problem, which on the short run, may supersede unit cost analysis. A simplistic calculation based on 
the preservation of turnover may thus give useful hints. The shortcomings of the estimate will be 
addressed at the end. 
 
Assume an efficient USP whose total turnover is: 
 (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos)       1st period (monopoly)     (1) 
 (P1b . a1 . V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s)      2nd period (competition) (2)  
 
With P for price, V for volume of mail; b designate bulk mail s separated mail; a and b stand for the 
market shares for bulk and separated mail owned by the USP.  
Vob+ Vos is the total volume of mail, normalised to 1 for the first period.  
Let us also consider first period prices Pob, Pos being equal to 1. 
Since by hypothesis the USP is assumed to be efficient, total costs equal the total turnover. 
 
First period, the incumbent is a monopoly 
    ao = bo = 1              market shares 
    (ao .Vob) + (bo . Vos) = 1       total volume mail 
    (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos) = 1  total turnover 
 
Second period, opening to competition    
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    a1 + b1 ≤ 2              incumbent market shares  
    (a1 . V1b) + (b1 . V1s)          total incumbent volume mail 
    (P1b . a1 . V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s)    total incumbent turnover 
 
a1< ao expresses that a portion of the bulk mail is diverted by new entrants.   
P1b < Pob and P1s > Pos expresse the change in the price structure. 
 
The financial equilibrium constraint for the incumbent is  (1) = (2): 
 (P1b . a1 .V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s) =  (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos)   (3) 
Let us find the value of P1s 
(P1b . a1 .V1b) + (P1s .b1 . V1s) = 1      (4) 
(P1s . b1 . V1s) = 1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b) 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)          (5) 
     b1. V1s 
 
Not surprisingly, the compensating price for separated mail depends on the turnover generated by 
bulk mail and the evolution of the volume of separated mail. 
Let us assume newcomers are only interested in bulk mail so that bo = b1 = 1. We may compute an 
estimate of P1s based on actual figures. 
 
 As a first step let us suppose that the demand elasticity for separated mail is inelastic (εd/p) (V1s = 
Vos), hence V1s . b1 = Vos . bo 
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)
Considering the French case 
          (6) 
    bo . Vos 
 
5  (bo . Vos) = 0,4; 
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)
Actual Swedish case tells us that after 14 years, CityMail has gained 13 % of the total bulk mail 
market (PTS 2007 p. 4 
          (7) 
          0,4 
 
Let us set boundaries for P1b . a1  
6). In United Kingdom after two years of full opening, new entrants have 
already diverted, 11.8% of the total addressed mail volume (Postcomm 2007 
7
                                                         
5  Note that the  Swedish case is close with bulk = 0,7 (PTS 2007 p.9) 
6 Equivalent to roughly 25% of the segments on which he is active (de Bijl 2006 p. 13). 
7  Unfortunately no data related to bulk mail were available. 
). On the other hand,    
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Cohen (2005) computes one third as an upper limit for Sweden. Similarly, Deutsche Post’s share 
which is actually about 91 percent of Germany's mail-market is, according to a Commerzbank's study, 
expected to drop to 70 percent within five years after total liberalization. Hence a sound hypothesis 
may be that new entrants may capture between 10 to 30 % at best of the bulk mail-market. The share 
left to incumbent therefore varies between 70 % and 90 % so that a1 ∈ [0.7; 0.9]. 
According to the Swedish experience, the price for bulk mail could  decrease by 20 to 10 % 
(Andersson 2007), so let P1b ∈ [0.8; 0.9]. 
Hence altogether (P1b . a1) ∈ [0.56; 0.81 ] 
 
Results are displayed in table n° 3 and commented below. 
TABLE N° 3 
Necessary P1s separated-mail price level compensating entry,  








period  = 
100 %) 
b1 . V1s  =  bo .Vos  b1 . V1s < bo . Vos 
























(a1 . V1b) + 
(b1 . V1s) 
(first period 
= 1)  





(a1 . V1b) + 
(b1 . V1s) 
(first 















100 %  1,66  1,28  0,82  0,94  1,69  1,31 
105 %  1,62  1,22  0,84  0,97  1,65  1,25 
110 %  1,58  1.16  0,86  0,99  1,60  1,19 
115 %  1,53  1.10  0,88  1,02  1,56  1,12 
120 %  1,50  1,04  0,90  1,05  1,52  1,06 
 
 
  As a second step, let us take into account the demand elasticity. Since most actual computed 
demand elasticity (εd/p) are negative (Cazals Florens 2004), separated volume owned by incumbent 
could be adversely affected. Yet, since a great deal of actual separated mail responds to unavoidable 
needs let us assume that only the first 10 % price rise have an immediate impact on separated mail 
demand. 
Let us calculate an estimate for b1 . V1s. using the upper figure of εd/p = - 0,2 (Cazals Florens 2004). 
Hence b1 . V1s = 0,392 
8 and equation (5) becomes (8).  
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)
                                                         
8 1*(0,4 * (1-0,02)) 
          (8) 
          0,392    
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The dissimilarity between (7) and (8) is not large enough to produce significant discrepancies on 
P1s prices even if P1s increases a little more. 
 
Our rough estimate shows that in a country like France where bulk mail represents 60 % of total 
mail, a drop of 10 % in the bulk market owned by the historical operator, associated with a drop of 
10 % of bulk mail prices, would call, everything being equal, for an increase of 28 % in separated mail 
prices. With an optimistic rise of bulk mail volume by 20 %, prices of separated mail should only need 
to increase by 4 %. In the worst hypothetical case, a drop of a 20% in the price and of 30% in the share 
of the bulk mail of the incumbent would require an increase of more than 50 % for separated mail 
price.  
 
These figures may seem harsh. They stem from a joint fall in market share and price of bulk mail, 
which in turn influences the incumbent’s remaining volume. The cumulated phenomenon dramatically 
amplifies the consequence of a sole market loss. The data are nonetheless consistent with Cohen 
(2003) findings and Andersson (2007) actual data. Let us also remind the 30 % increase Posten AB 
introduced, a few years after Full Market Opening  on separated letters. Even if it was due to a 
loophole in price monitoring; this rise was alleged to be a response to growing costs (PTS 2007 p. 8). 
Moreover Cohen (2005) asserts that price (including VAT) for first class mail has nearly double since 
market opening in Sweden. Price increases for separated mail are also noticed in many European 
countries, even if their pace is caped. 
Nonetheless, these estimates should not be taken for granted. They do not take into account several 
important parameters as for instance, productivity gains; employment downsizing, restructuring of the 
network… that could ease the shock. It is also worth remembering that the USP have several sources 
of revenues. During the last period postal operators have increased the share of their other sources, for 
instance, parcels, registered mail… as well as of financial services. Moreover, as the market losses or 
the price decline will not occur in one night, it will render the transition easier. It is also worth 
mentioning that, regulation agencies will not leave USP free to charge disproportionate prices.  
 
Finally  the figures should rather be considered as an altogether upper approximation for the 
productivity constraint that will stem from market opening. Nevertheless, there is more to think about 
when taking into consideration the delivery cost function. 
 
 
3. A TRANSITORY COMPETITION? 
 
Depending chiefly on the number of mail per inhabitant and the cost profile of routes, there are 
credible hints that the competition could quite quickly reach an equilibrium where USP would remain    
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steadily dominant. Thus contrary to some fears the final survival of USP would not be endangered and 
probably even USO might not require eventually significant subsidies. In this event, the foreseen price 
increase could be a one for all change of level. To understand this potential result one has to focus on a 
combination of factors that were not adequately taken into consideration until now.  
The overall cost delivery function for one country depends markedly on its postal density. Indeed, 
the cost of serving a particular address rests on the number of delivery points that can be served during 
one hour. The deviation  of this number,  ranked per routes served,  draws a cost profile  which is 
specific for each country.  The  competitive  burden that will weight on USP  depends on this cost 
profile. If the curve contour is fairly flat, at least along a lengthy segment (graph n°3, see also Cohen 
2003, NERA 1998), there may be little cream to skim, as the fraction of profitable routes would be 
limited. Indeed, once the profitable mail would be captured, prices could rise slower than the traffic 
increase (graph n°3 , between p1 and p2), thus not covering the growth of the new entrant’s operational 
costs. The phenomenon is especially true, since as a newcomer he needs to offer a discount.  
In the end, once a definite share of the market has been diverted, and the corresponding price 
change implemented, the incumbent’s single price and the remaining route costs will become closer 
and the competition hence reaches a step and may pause. Cohen (2003) stresses that in United Sates: 
“ten percent of the routes generate nearly half the gross profits”, one may infer that an incumbent 








delivery cost  
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Postal density depends on three main factors. It is firstly related to geographical factors, noticeably 
a country’s surface and the distribution of its population on the territory. The share of urban 
population is thus of a major interest. Therefore, relatively plane delivery cost profile, at least along a 
large segment of the curve, is more likely to be found in countries where the share of urban population 
is high (table n°4). However, postal density also rests on technical aspects, for instance the way 
delivery is performed. Should it be done only at home or partly in post office letter boxes or alongside 
roads, it may greatly vary. Postal density is, for instance, higher in United States than in France 
(Bernard and alii 2004), even if United States is evidently a wider country with many remote areas 




Comparison of Unit Delivery Costs of La Poste and USPS  
Source : Bernard and al. 2004 
 
To summarise, new entrants may quite rapidly skim the easy contestable segment, which is sorted 
bulk mail, but because of postal density matters and of economies of scale and scope, they probably 
will encounter true difficulties to go farther.  
The countries that may correspond to such a situation mainly  combine relatively high 
correspondence per inhabitant and urban population level. Approximately 10 countries within EU 27 
match the two  criteria, of which five  have already completed deregulation.  Anyhow,  other  side 
aspects, such as minimal Universal Service Obligations, low legacy costs or wage premium... should    
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not be forgotten. The fact that, in Germany, the government intended to fix a minimum wage for the 
whole postal sector illustrates that legacy costs or wage premium are also important factors.  
 
TABLE N°4 
Postal market 2003 data for EU 27 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2004 data. INSEE for urban population * Millions of Euros for EU 27. ** USA: UPU 2005 
data: letter 2007 price, First class + standard mail turnover. 

























area in % 
of letters 
Germany  194  88.0  0.55  0.50  14 076  85 
United 
Kingdom  315  91.0  0.44  0.41  11 847  / 
France  321  76.0  0.53  0.52  11 300  79 
Italy  105  86.0  0.60  0.58  3 973  / 
Sweden  334  33.0  0.60  0.49  2 753  / 
Netherlands  326  97.0  0.40  0.38  2 660  / 
Belgium  /  97.0  0.50  0.47  2 000  / 
Spain  117  75.0  0.27  0.31  1 854  82 
Austria  /  65.0  0.55  0.52  1 701  / 
Denmark  269  67.0  0.55  0.43  1 482  69 
Finland  412  49,0  0.65  0.53  1 035  / 
Portugal  124  79.0  0.42  0.53  648  81 
Ireland  188  57.0  0.48  0.39  515  78 
Greece  54  69,0  0.49  0.60  401  / 
Luxembourg  295  81.0  0.50  0.43  146  92 
Poland  83  62.0  0.42  0.89  1 161  61 
Czech Republic  93  77.0  0.20  0.39  396  61 
Hungary  91  65.0  0.36  0.64  269  60 
Slovenia  199  49.0  0.20  0.27  128  74 
Estonia  55  69.0  0.28  0.51  42  / 
Cyprus  76  66.0  0.34  0.38  30  / 
Bulgaria  10  70.0  0.23  0.63  29  84 
Livonia  28  68.0  0.23  0.49  19  38 
Lithuania  15  67.0  0.29  0.59  19  / 
Slovakia  96  56.0  0.37  0.75  /  50 
Malta  /  91.0  0.16  0.23  /  / 
Romania  15  55.0  0.12  0.31  /  48 
Unweighted 
average   159.0  70.6  0.395  0.488  2 436.8  69.5 
USA **  667,31  79,0  0.41 $  /      55 010 $  /    




Since the previous openings where actually of little consequences, the Full Market Opening planned 
for 2011 will represent a large leap for many postal operators. It will bring along a strong strain for the 
universal service provider, especially because single pricing for separated mail is commonly chosen. 
Historical operators will have incentives to noticeably raise the prices for individual mail and to try to 
sidestep the Universal Service Obligations. This result especially holds for countries where postal 
density is uneven, with significant discrepancies between areas, where postal delivery average per 
inhabitant is high, and legacy costs significant (PWC 2006). In these circumstances, several 
competitors will be prone to enter the market, as well as prosperous niches will be available. However 
once the first shock, with a significant change in price level for separated mail, will be absorbed, it is 
likely that a new market equilibrium will arise where competition could pause. This result stems from 
the cost profile of postal routes that often depicts a relatively flat segment. The more the cost profile of 
postal routes will be plane, on a lengthy portion of the curve, the quicker the new market equilibrium 
will establish. Once the rather flat position reached, market losses for the USP will raise slower than 
route costs will increase for new competitors. Therefore after the first step of price rise, the USP will 
be able to face competition. Approximately ten countries in the EU 27 could match these criteria. 
However the final opinion must be balanced with other national  factors,  such as the extent of 
Universal Service Obligations, legacy costs or wage premium, which may prolong the difficulties for 
the USP. 
 
Will the new equilibrium be a better one? On a welfare economics point of view, the overall prices 
adjustment could only change the distribution of the weight borne by the various agents. It could be a 
null sum swap. However, on the one hand, because of diminishing scale and scope economies, the 
lower number of items delivered per inhabitant by the incumbent should lessen its efficiency. On the 
other hand, due to the rationalisation induced by market opening, cost effectiveness of the delivery 
should  increase.  The  overall  combined result is thus indecisive,  especially  when taking into 
consideration the number of new entrants and the evolution of the whole market. Prospects regarding 
to the volume of mail are hence a key issue. Should the traffic stagnate or decrease due to the technical 
trend, and the balance could be negative.     
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APPENDIX 
 
GRAPH N° 5A ET 5B 
French postal market in volume for 2006-2005 (billions) 
 
 
French postal market turnover in 200 6-2005 (billions of Euros) 
 
 
Source : ARCEP 2007    
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TABLE N°5 
USO ACCESSIBILITY CRITERION FOR POSTAL SERVICES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
* Proriol 2006 p.15, Hérisson 2007 p. 247 
 
Table 6: Employment at Sweden Post 1985 -2005 
Year   Number of 
Employees  
Year   Number of 
Employees  
1985   54 000   1998   42 108  
1990   57 000   2001   41 669  
1993   50 000   2003   37 905  
1996   45 137   2005   33 520  
Geoff Bickerton (2006) « Postal deregulation: Its impact on postal workers and the response of a postal union” 
14th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, 31 May – 3 June, Bern, Switzerland 
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